The EU amidst the Iran War

Bombings also targeted Iran’s nuclear military installations; in response, Iran expanded the scope of the war by attacking nearby American and Israeli bases, including Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, while a drone struck Britain's Akrotiri base in Cyprus and missiles crossed Turkish airspace. However, despite numerous declarations from Trump claiming that the war would end soon, the reality does not seem to tell otherwise, while Iran has taken advantage of its strategic position to block the Strait of Hormuz, which carries about 20 million barrels of oil and petroleum products per day — roughly a fifth of global consumption. This has created significant pressure, not only in the US but also on the entire economy.

Recently, a two-week ceasefire was brokered by Pakistan on April 8, and just six days ago (April 21), Trump announced he would extend the ceasefire at Pakistan's request, citing a "seriously fractured" Iranian government. However, on April 22, Iran attacked at least three commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz, and the US naval blockade continues. The situation is therefore unstable and its consequences ripple well beyond the Middle East, and the European Union is among the most affected actors. Despite being a historical ally of the US and receiving much pressure from the American president, the EU’s position remains unclear and fractured. This article analyses the stance of individual EU member states and the possible courses of action the Union could take in response.

The EU’s response to the Iran war cannot really be described as a position, due to the diverging opinions it has within its member states. What exists instead is a patchwork of national reactions, where each actor has a different reaction towards the conflict. In fact, there are four main positions within the European Union.

Germany and some of the Eastern European member states represent the most striking case. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, shortly before meeting Trump at the White House, described the Iranian government as a "terrorist regime." It also publicly shared several of Trump’s opinions and declarations regarding the situation. Although Germany has not contributed militarily, the rhetorical shift matters: it signalled to Washington that the largest economy in the EU was willing to frame the war in the terms the US preferred. The same includes other countries such as Poland, the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, and Romania, which have emphasized the security problem that Iran represented for the world order. This reasoning, however, is not only about Iran; these European countries depend on the American security umbrella against Russia and are therefore more committed to cooperate with them.

On the other hand, France, the United Kingdom and to some extent Italy have a more nuanced and uncertain approach regarding the situation. Despite helping the United States and Israel to intercept Iranian missiles and defend allies in the region, they still have refused to intervene and to officially take a specific stance. France has authorised the use of its airspace for US missions linked to the conflict; the UK under Keir Starmer initially restricted American use of the Diego Garcia base before walking the restriction back after Iranian attacks on its bases in Cyprus. Their stance therefore relied on distancing themselves from the war to preserve their insistence on international law, but enough to keep alignment with Washington to keep American support flowing to Ukraine.

A smaller group, but still significant, is the one led by Spain under Pedro Sánchez, which refused to allow US weapons-carrying aircraft bound for the Iran conflict to use their bases. According to these countries, this attack is an illegal act of aggression under the UN Charter, and no amount of strategic convenience justifies pretending otherwise.

Finally, we could also include the EU's own institutions and most visibly Kaja Kallas, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs. She tried to articulate a common European voice that does not, in reality, exist on the ground. Additionally, she described the situation as being “perilous” and insisted on freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz as "non-negotiable," and most recently described Trump's daily reversals on the blockade as "reckless." On the other hand, Ursula von der Leyen and the Commission issued similar appeals to de-escalate the situation.

Following these reactions are also heavy consequences on the European economy. European gas prices spiked around 20% on March 2, and the European Central Bank has warned that a prolonged conflict could push Germany and Italy into recession by the end of 2026. Additionally, European chemical and steel manufacturers have imposed surcharges of up to 30% to fight the energy and feedstock costs. The EU therefore faces a situation where it could not trade with the biggest exporters of oil and gas, due to the sanctions imposed on Russia and the current blockage imposed on the Strait of Hormuz. What could then be the European reaction to face this situation and to minimize the effects on its economy?

Being an important actor and not directly involved in the conflict, the EU could play the mediator role that Washington has vacated. On April 17, Macron, Starmer, Merz, and Meloni co-presided in Paris over a conference on navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. This was already an attempt to calm the tension and, realistically, the most immediate contribution Europe can make. However, the difference in position within Brussels might make it harder for them to present themselves as a credible actor for peace. European mediation is therefore possible, but it starts from a position of depleted credibility on both sides.

In the medium term, Europe has to accelerate the energy transition it has been promising for a decade. To do so, it has to reduce the dependence itself. This means faster deployment of renewables, serious investment in grid interconnection across member states, and a reopening of the nuclear debate that has divided France and Germany for decades. This has been a long controversy, but the situation might accelerate the current trend.

On a long-term perspective, the EU members could invest in their own resources, which would allow them to reduce their dependency towards other states. In early 2023, the EU’s first significant deposits of rare earth minerals were discovered in Kiruna, a traditionally iron ore mining town in northern Sweden. These deposits, if exploited, could give the EU significant autonomy in the production of critical raw materials. This would be a step in the “geopolitical Europe" direction but would also drastically improve the EU’s strategic situation by guaranteeing at least some supply. However, the deposits are on land that belongs to the Sami indigenous group and is additionally also an important habitat for threatened reindeer. The construction of a mine there would constitute somewhat of a challenge for indigenous rights and environmental protection standards. But considering that these minerals are usually mined under much more serious environmental and human rights violations, which currently are just kind of “ignored” by the EU, a mine in Kiruna would constitute a net reduction in harm. This remains a political problem, however, as onshoring the production of CRM and therefore “internalizing” some of the harms could expose it to stringent regulation under EU jurisdiction and potentially cause a public backlash.

The Iran war has placed the EU in front of a question it has spent decades avoiding: what kind of international actor does it want to be — a moral voice without power, or a strategic actor willing to accept the costs that power requires?